Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024983
 
 

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Variable Geometry Europe - Patching Together what Works in the Fight Against Hard-Core Cartels: Carrots, Sticks, Custody and Leniency


Patrick Joachim Dunphy


Institute fir Trade and Commercial Law

February 2007


Abstract:     
The issue of fighting cartel-behaviour in the European Community has been continually addressed both by the European Commission and National Competition Authorities. Concerted practices in corporate governance pursuant to Article 81 EC, continue to be a major problem to the promotion of a competitive Common Market.

This paper aims to analyse these efforts in terms of their effectiveness, and efficiency. By way of viewing select EU Member States anti-cartel provisions, and comparing these to their intra-EC as well as to their U.S. pendants, differences as to the efficiency and the effectiveness of the analysed policies should become evident to the reader. Explicitly, the relevant U.K., U.S., German and French provisions are reviewed.

At the Conclusion of this debate, it will be argued that an effective anti-cartel regime must consist of a severe sanctioning regime complimented by a clear and concise leniency policy integrating the notion of Amnesty Plus, thus providing corporate decision makers with a clear and concise structure in corporate governance. The reader should thus acquire a good understanding of the analysed regimes, while noticing the variable geometry, which is current European Competition Law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Cartels, Article 81, EC Competition Law, Leniency, ECN, Regulation 1/2003

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Date posted: October 29, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Dunphy, Patrick Joachim, Variable Geometry Europe - Patching Together what Works in the Fight Against Hard-Core Cartels: Carrots, Sticks, Custody and Leniency (February 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1024983

Contact Information

Patrick Joachim Dunphy (Contact Author)
Institute fir Trade and Commercial Law ( email )
Germany
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