References (27)


Citations (4)



Do Analyst Recommendations Reflect Shareholder Rights?

Don M. Autore

Florida State University - College of Business

Tunde Kovacs

University of Massachusetts Lowell

Vivek Singh

April 10, 2008

We examine whether sell-side analyst recommendations reflect shareholder rights. Our rationale is that analysts should be influenced by external governance only if market participants do not efficiently price its value. We find that stronger shareholder rights are associated with more favorable recommendations. Further analysis reveals that analysts favor firms with strong shareholder rights only when strong rights appear to be warranted, but do not penalize firms for having strong rights when not needed. These findings occupy middle ground in the debate on the pricing efficiency of shareholder rights. Moreover, we find that firm value is positively associated with the strength of shareholder rights regardless of the expected external governance structure. The latter result is consistent with a "one-size-fits-all" interpretation, and implies that firms across the board should reduce their number of anti-takeover provisions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: analyst recommendations, corporate governance, shareholder rights, anti-takeover provisions, market efficiency

JEL Classification: G24, G29, G34, G14

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: November 5, 2007 ; Last revised: December 5, 2012

Suggested Citation

Autore, Don M. and Kovacs, Tunde and Singh, Vivek, Do Analyst Recommendations Reflect Shareholder Rights? (April 10, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1025627 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1025627

Contact Information

Don M. Autore
Florida State University - College of Business ( email )
821 ACADEMIC WAY, Room 314 RBA
P.O. Box 3061110
Tallahassee, FL 32306-1110
United States
850-644-7857 (Phone)
Tunde Kovacs (Contact Author)
University of Massachusetts Lowell ( email )
1 University Ave
Lowell, MA 01854
United States
No contact information is available for Vivek Singh
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,307
Downloads: 194
Download Rank: 117,348
References:  27
Citations:  4

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.219 seconds