Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1025627
 
 

References (27)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Do Analyst Recommendations Reflect Shareholder Rights?


Don M. Autore


Florida State University - College of Business

Tunde Kovacs


University of Massachusetts at Lowell

Vivek Singh


University of Michigan at Dearborn - College of Business; University of Michigan-Dearborn

April 10, 2008


Abstract:     
We examine whether sell-side analyst recommendations reflect shareholder rights. Our rationale is that analysts should be influenced by external governance only if market participants do not efficiently price its value. We find that stronger shareholder rights are associated with more favorable recommendations. Further analysis reveals that analysts favor firms with strong shareholder rights only when strong rights appear to be warranted, but do not penalize firms for having strong rights when not needed. These findings occupy middle ground in the debate on the pricing efficiency of shareholder rights. Moreover, we find that firm value is positively associated with the strength of shareholder rights regardless of the expected external governance structure. The latter result is consistent with a "one-size-fits-all" interpretation, and implies that firms across the board should reduce their number of anti-takeover provisions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: analyst recommendations, corporate governance, shareholder rights, anti-takeover provisions, market efficiency

JEL Classification: G24, G29, G34, G14

working papers series


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Date posted: November 5, 2007 ; Last revised: December 5, 2012

Suggested Citation

Autore, Don M. and Kovacs, Tunde and Singh, Vivek, Do Analyst Recommendations Reflect Shareholder Rights? (April 10, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1025627 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1025627

Contact Information

Don M. Autore
Florida State University - College of Business ( email )
821 ACADEMIC WAY, Room 314 RBA
P.O. Box 3061110
Tallahassee, FL 32306-1110
United States
850-644-7857 (Phone)
Tunde Kovacs (Contact Author)
University of Massachusetts at Lowell ( email )
600 Suffolk St
Lowell, MA 01854
United States
Vivek Singh
University of Michigan at Dearborn - College of Business ( email )
19000 Hubbard Drive
FCS
Dearborn, MI 48126
United States
313-583-6533 (Phone)
313-271-9837 (Fax)
University of Michigan-Dearborn ( email )
19000 Hubbard Drive
Fairlane Center South
Dearborn, MI 48126
United States
313-583-6533 (Phone)
313-271-9837 (Fax)
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