Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026023
 
 

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Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics


Judith Goldstein


Stanford University - Department of Political Science

Richard H. Steinberg


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law


UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 07-14
Law and Contemporary Problems, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This article argues that the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization has engaged in substantial lawmaking since its inception and that, in many circumstances, decisions rendered by court-like bodies in the WTO are adhered to even when the same policy would not gain support in multilateral negotiations. The emergence of judicial lawmaking at the WTO is due to largely to the decline of non-reciprocity in the regime, which has catalyzed North-South deadlock in the legislative process. As the prospects for broad legislative rule-making have declined, judicial lawmaking has become more common. Judicial lawmaking is consequential only if the powerful members of the WTO choose to adhere to judicial rulings. To explain adherence, we offer a model of decision-making in the United States and suggest that, in a number of circumstances, the President and Congress find compliance with international court decisions to be in their interest, resulting in trade opening that would not have resulted from ministerial negotiations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: WTO, judicial law-making, international court decisions, U.S. Trade Politics

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Date posted: November 1, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Goldstein, Judith and Steinberg, Richard H., Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics. UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 07-14; Law and Contemporary Problems, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026023

Contact Information

Judith Goldstein
Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )
616 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
(650) 723-0671 (Phone)
(650) 723-1808 (Fax)
Richard H. Steinberg (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-267-2064 (Phone)
310-206-7010 (Fax)
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