The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions

41 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2007

See all articles by Jeffrey K. Staton

Jeffrey K. Staton

Emory University - Department of Political Science; University of Gothenburg - V-Dem Institute

Georg Vanberg

Duke University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 23, 2007

Abstract

An established line of research demonstrates that vague judicial opinions are less likely to be implemented than clear opinions. Vague opinions thus present a puzzle. Why would judges craft opinions that risk non-compliance? We argue that the relationships between judges and other policymakers in separation-of-powers systems are central to understanding this puzzle. Opinion vagueness reflects efforts to resolve core trade-offs associated with judicial policy making that bear some resemblance to standard accounts of political delegation. Vagueness offers judges the ability to manage their uncertainty over policy outcomes and to hide likely defiance from public view. At the same time, vagueness removes a central source of pressure for compliance that judges can place on other policymakers. Using a game-theoretic model, we identify conditions under which judges use vagueness precisely as legislatures use statutory discretion. We also demonstrate conditions under which judges use vagueness in ways unanticipated by standard delegation accounts.

Keywords: judicial politics, delegation, vagueness

Suggested Citation

Staton, Jeffrey K. and Vanberg, Georg, The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions (August 23, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1028671 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1028671

Jeffrey K. Staton (Contact Author)

Emory University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-6559 (Phone)
404-727-4586 (Fax)

University of Gothenburg - V-Dem Institute ( email )

United States

Georg Vanberg

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

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Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States