Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030115
 
 

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Should Innovation Rationalize Supra-Competitive Prices? A Skeptical Speculation


Tim Brennan


University of Maryland, Baltimore County - Department of Public Policy; Resources for the Future


Pros and Cons of High Prices Seminar, 2007

Abstract:     
A recent criticism of competition policy is that antitrust authorities shouldn't focus their concern on prices, since the welfare losses of prices are trivial compared to longer run innovation effects. At minimum, there's a problematic trade-off between so-called static price and dynamic efficiencies. On this view, if there is a credible argument supporting the idea that collusion or merger increases incentives to innovate, one should not worry about price. We entertain here the hypothesis that antitrust should not worry about innovation, just as it should not worry about effects on other markets. Antitrust takes place in the shadow of patent laws, which presumably have evolved to provide efficient innovation incentives when markets are competitive, as most are.

To weaken antitrust enforcement presumes that patent law is not set correctly. A better remedy would be to adjust patent law and other tools for encouraging innovation, e.g., tax credits or prizes. To distort the application of antitrust law to fix shortcomings in patent law provides a correction only if there is a potential antitrust violation (e.g., an otherwise anticompetitive merger) to ignore. Sectors with no antitrust "events" would remain uncorrected.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: antitrust, innovation, competition

JEL Classification: L40, O38, K21

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Date posted: November 15, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Brennan, Tim, Should Innovation Rationalize Supra-Competitive Prices? A Skeptical Speculation. Pros and Cons of High Prices Seminar, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030115

Contact Information

Tim Brennan (Contact Author)
University of Maryland, Baltimore County - Department of Public Policy ( email )
1000 Hilltop Circle
Baltimore, MD 21250
United States
410-455-3229 (Phone)
410-455-1172 (Fax)
Resources for the Future ( email )
1616 P Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
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