Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030845
 
 

References (172)



 


 



The Managerial Thesis Revised: Independent Directors and the CEO 'Directorate'


Allen Kaufman


University of New Hampshire - Department of Management

Ernie Englander


George Washington University - Department of Strategic Management & Public Policy

Christopher L. Tucci


Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne - MTEI

July 2006


Abstract:     
This paper makes two claims. The first posits that CEOs, active and retired, have disproportionately filled the independent director positions mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley and the private exchange reforms. The second builds from this observation: Corporate control has shifted from focal firm managerial teams to a CEO-inter-corporate directorate. To test these hypothesis, we examine the board demographics of those publicly-traded corporations whose CEOs are members of The Business Roundtable, the premier lobbying organization representing the interests of U.S. corporate managers. We constructed our hypotheses to resolve conflicting assessments among agency theorists and corporate strategy scholars on independent directors' promised redemptive effects for resolving issues of excessive CEO pay and reconciling CEO pay for performance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: corporate governance, CEOs, boards of directors

JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22, M10

working papers series


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Date posted: November 19, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Kaufman, Allen and Englander, Ernie and Tucci, Christopher L., The Managerial Thesis Revised: Independent Directors and the CEO 'Directorate' (July 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030845 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1030845

Contact Information

Allen Kaufman
University of New Hampshire - Department of Management ( email )
Durham, NH 03824
United States
603-862-4535 (Phone)
Ernie Englander (Contact Author)
George Washington University - Department of Strategic Management & Public Policy ( email )
2201 G Street Northwest
615E Funger Hall/
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-8203 (Phone)
202-994-8113 (Fax)
Christopher L. Tucci
Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne - MTEI ( email )
Odyssea
Station 5
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland
+41.21.693.0023 (Phone)
+41.21.693.0020 (Fax)
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