Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=103130
 
 

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Corporate Ownership Around the World


Rafael La Porta


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Florencio Lopez de Silanes


EDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

August 1998

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1840

Abstract:     
We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions or other widely held corporations is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. The results suggest that the central agency problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rather than that of restricting empire building by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

JEL Classification: G32

working papers series


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Date posted: July 31, 1998  

Suggested Citation

La Porta, Rafael and Lopez de Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei, Corporate Ownership Around the World (August 1998). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1840. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=103130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.103130

Contact Information

Rafael La Porta (Contact Author)
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Florencio Lopez de Silanes
EDHEC Business School ( email )
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
Nice, 06202
France
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07 (Phone)
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Andrei Shleifer
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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