Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=10315
 
 

Citations



 


 



Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence


Rachel T. A. Croson


College of Business, UT Arlington; University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management - Department of Organizations, Strategy and International Management; University of Texas at Dallas - School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences

Robert H. Mnookin


Harvard Law School


Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1997).

Abstract:     
A distinctive characteristic of our mechanisms for conflict resolution is that litigation is carried out by agents chosen by disputing principles. Does the fact that clients choose lawyers to carry on their disputes facilitate dispute resolution or instead exacerbate conflict? The dominant contemporary view is that the involvement of lawyers magnifies the contentiousness of litigation and wastes social resources, prolonging and escalating the conflict in ways that enrich the legal profession but not the clients. But in a recent article, Gilson and Mnookin suggested another possibility: by choosing lawyers with reputations for cooperation, clients may commit to cooperative litigation in circumstance where the clients themselves would not otherwise trust each other. Using the methodology of experimental economics, this paper presents a test of their idea that, by choosing cooperative agents under well-specified procedures, principals may sustain more cooperation than they could on their own. Our experimental findings are consistent with the Gilson-Mnookin hypothesis.

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: February 14, 1997  

Suggested Citation

Croson, Rachel T. A. and Mnookin, Robert H., Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence. Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1997).. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10315

Contact Information

Rachel T. A. Croson
College of Business, UT Arlington ( email )
415 S West St Apt no 205
Arlington, TX 76019
United States
University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management - Department of Organizations, Strategy and International Management ( email )
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States
University of Texas at Dallas - School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences ( email )
P.O. Box 830688, GR 31
800 W. Campbell Drive
Richardson, TX 75083
United States
972-883-6016 (Phone)
Robert H. Mnookin (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Hauser Hall 416
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-9201 (Phone)
617-496-3777 (Fax)
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