Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031771
 
 

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Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing


Candace M. Zierdt


Stetson University - College of Law

Ellen S. Podgor


Stetson University College of Law


Kentucky Law Journal, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2007

Abstract:     
This article examines deferred and non-prosecution agreements entered into between corporations and the Department of Justice (DOJ) through the lens of contract policing theory. It adds a new dimension to the contractual law now applicable to plea bargains and proffer agreements by suggesting key provisions that should be prohibited in deferred prosecution agreements. Three provisions common to many deferred prosecution agreements, or used by the government as leverage to secure a deferred prosecution agreement, are of particular interest here. These are: (1) the requirement of a corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege; (2) the determination of a breach of the agreement being within the sole province of the government; and (3) the provision that corporations not abide by previously negotiated contract terms that allow the corporation to pay the attorney fees of corporate employees. Specifically, this article examines the viability of specific provisions within these agreements when matched up against contract policing principles such as duress and unconscionability. This article concludes that corporations are deprived of basic contract rights as a result of the over-powering prosecutorial power used in reaching these agreements.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: corporate crime, deferred prosecution, white collar crime, contract, unconscionability, duress

JEL Classification: K12, K14, K20, K22

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Date posted: November 22, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Zierdt, Candace M. and Podgor, Ellen S., Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing. Kentucky Law Journal, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031771

Contact Information

Candace M. Zierdt
Stetson University - College of Law ( email )
1401 61st Street South
Gulfport, FL 33707
United States

Ellen S. Podgor
Stetson University College of Law ( email )
1401 61st Street South
Gulfport, FL 33707
United States
727 562 7348 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.stetson.edu/tmpl/faculty/memberProfile.aspx?id=88

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