Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031853
 
 

Citations (5)



 
 

Footnotes (2)



 


 



Behavioral versus Institutional Antecedents of Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: An Experimental Approach


Yuval Feldman


Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law; Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics

Orly Lobel


University of San Diego School of Law; Harvard Law School

November 1, 2007

Regulation & Governance, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 165-192, 2008
San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-126

Abstract:     
Social enforcement, the decentralized action by organizational actors of monitoring, identifying, and reporting legal violations, is widely recognized as a key factor in ensuring good governance. This article reports on a study conducted in the United States and Israel examining the behavior of individuals when confronting unlawful conduct within their workplaces. The study provides novel insights into the relationships between state-based, organizational-based, and employee-based enforcement. It finds that the likelihood and the manner of reporting will vary depending on the type of illegality and is strongly correlated to perceptions of legitimacy, job security, and voice within the workplace. Comparing illegalities, employees prefer to report clear violations by rank-and-file employees rather than violations by managers. At the same time, external reporting to government or media entities is most likely when violations involve the organization as a whole or implicates top management. The study also finds cultural and gender differences in reporting patterns. Finally, the study demonstrates that social norms are more predictive of social enforcement than expected organizational costs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: corporate self-regulation, decentralized enforcement, motivations for social sanctioning, social norms, whistleblowing

JEL Classification: K42, M14, Z1

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 23, 2007 ; Last revised: April 8, 2013

Suggested Citation

Feldman, Yuval and Lobel, Orly, Behavioral versus Institutional Antecedents of Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: An Experimental Approach (November 1, 2007). Regulation & Governance, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 165-192, 2008; San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-126. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031853 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1031853

Contact Information

Yuval Feldman (Contact Author)
Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law ( email )
Faculty of Law
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel
Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )
124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Orly Lobel
University of San Diego School of Law ( email )
5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States
HOME PAGE: http://home.sandiego.edu/%7Elobel/
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,634
Downloads: 260
Download Rank: 66,105
Citations:  5
Footnotes:  2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.532 seconds