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Negotiating Complex Contracts


Mark Klein


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Peyman Faratin


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Hiroki Sayama


New England Complex Systems Institute

Yaneer Bar-Yam


New England Complex Systems Institute

10/01/01

MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4196

Abstract:     
Work to date on computational models of negotiation has focused almost exclusively on defining contracts consisting of one or a few independent issues and tractable contract spaces. Many real-world contracts, by contrast, are much more complex, consisting of multiple inter-dependent issues and intractably large contract spaces. This paper describes a simulated annealing based approach appropriate for negotiating such complex contracts that achieves near-optimal social welfares for negotiations with binary issue dependencies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Keywords: non-linear negotiation, interdependent issues

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Date posted: December 6, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Klein, Mark and Faratin, Peyman and Sayama, Hiroki and Bar-Yam, Yaneer, Negotiating Complex Contracts (10/01/01). MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4196. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1040961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1040961

Contact Information

Mark Klein (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
NE20-336
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6796 (Phone)
Peyman Faratin
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
77 Massachusetts Ave.
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
Hiroki Sayama
New England Complex Systems Institute ( email )
24 Mt. Auburn St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Yaneer Bar-Yam
New England Complex Systems Institute ( email )
24 Mt. Auburn St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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