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Negotiating Complex Contracts

Mark Klein
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Peyman Faratin
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Hiroki Sayama
New England Complex Systems Institute

Yaneer Bar-Yam
New England Complex Systems Institute


10/01/01

MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4196

Abstract:     
Work to date on computational models of negotiation has focused almost exclusively on defining contracts consisting of one or a few independent issues and tractable contract spaces. Many real-world contracts, by contrast, are much more complex, consisting of multiple inter-dependent issues and intractably large contract spaces. This paper describes a simulated annealing based approach appropriate for negotiating such complex contracts that achieves near-optimal social welfares for negotiations with binary issue dependencies.

Keywords: non-linear negotiation, interdependent issues

Working Paper Series

Date posted: December 06, 2007 ; Last revised: December 06, 2007

Suggested Citation

Klein, Mark, Faratin, Peyman, Sayama, Hiroki and Bar-Yam, Yaneer, Negotiating Complex Contracts (10/01/01). MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4196. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1040961


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Contact Information

Mark Klein (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
NE20-336
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6796 (Phone)
Yaneer Bar-Yam
New England Complex Systems Institute ( email )
24 Mt. Auburn St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Peyman Faratin
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
Hiroki Sayama
New England Complex Systems Institute ( email )
24 Mt. Auburn St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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