Endogenous Property Rights Regimes, Common Pool Resources and Trade

Galinato, Gregmar I.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1043941

Abstract

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Endogenous Property Rights Regimes, Common Pool Resources and Trade

Gregmar I. Galinato

Washington State University - School of Economic Sciences

May 14, 2008

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the impact of trade on resource stocks through endogenously selected property rights regimes. We present a model that shows welfare can be maximized when a community degrades its resource stock under optimally selected property rights regimes after opening to trade. Results from a laboratory experiment show that labor allocations, property rights regimes and resource stock levels do not follow the optimal dynamic Nash equilibrium path. Instead a non-optimal dynamic equilibrium path is selected due to incorrect initial labor allocation and property rights regime choices.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Resource Stock, Common Property Management, Property Rights

JEL Classification: Q56, Q2, C7, C9

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Date posted: December 5, 2007 ; Last revised: May 19, 2008

Suggested Citation

Galinato, Gregmar I. I., Endogenous Property Rights Regimes, Common Pool Resources and Trade (May 14, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1043941 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1043941

Contact Information

Gregmar I. Galinato (Contact Author)

Washington State University - School of Economic Sciences ( email )

Pullman, WA 99164
United States