Free Contracting in Bankruptcy
F. H. Buckley
George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty
This Comment argues for free bargaining in bankruptcy reorganizations and the enforcement of waivers of Chapter 11. Bankruptcy opt-outs would permit the parties to adopt risk- sharing strategies denied them by Chapter 11. This would correct a misincentive problem identified by Alan Schwartz, and would do so more effectively than Schwartz claims. More importantly, bankruptcy opt-outs would permit the parties to transfer control of the firm to creditors on default. Governance strategies of this kind police management misbehavior more effectively than the risk-sharing theories proposed by Schwartz and others.
JEL Classification: G33, K12
Date posted: June 6, 1997
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.172 seconds