Free Contracting in Bankruptcy
F. H. Buckley
George Mason University School of Law
This Comment argues for free bargaining in bankruptcy reorganizations and the enforcement of waivers of Chapter 11. Bankruptcy opt-outs would permit the parties to adopt risk- sharing strategies denied them by Chapter 11. This would correct a misincentive problem identified by Alan Schwartz, and would do so more effectively than Schwartz claims. More importantly, bankruptcy opt-outs would permit the parties to transfer control of the firm to creditors on default. Governance strategies of this kind police management misbehavior more effectively than the risk-sharing theories proposed by Schwartz and others.
JEL Classification: G33, K12
Date posted: June 6, 1997
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