Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=10569
 
 

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Affiliated Directors: Puppets of Management or Effective Directors?


April Klein


New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law

January 1998

New York University, Center for Law and Business, Working Paper No. 98-010

Abstract:     
This paper examines four non-mutually-exclusive hypotheses behind the inclusion of different types of directors and the impact they have on firm performance. Strong associations are found between the specific economic needs of companies and the incidence of directors most likely to fulfill these needs. In particular, theoretical and empirical evidence is presented that most affiliated directors are not puppets of management, but are placed on boards to serve specific, strategic needs of firms. In addition, no systematic relation is found between various measures of performance and director type. In total, it appears that, on average, boards of directors are constructed in a rational manner.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

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Date posted: September 23, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Klein, April, Affiliated Directors: Puppets of Management or Effective Directors? (January 1998). New York University, Center for Law and Business, Working Paper No. 98-010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10569 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.10569

Contact Information

April Klein (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law ( email )
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
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References:  58
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