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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070082
 
 

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Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism


Ingo Brigandt


University of Alberta - Department of Philosophy


Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, pp. 1305-1316, 2003

Abstract:     
Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: species, concepts, pluralism, eliminativism

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Date posted: December 12, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Brigandt, Ingo, Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, pp. 1305-1316, 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070082

Contact Information

Ingo Brigandt (Contact Author)
University of Alberta - Department of Philosophy ( email )
2-40 Assiniboia Hall
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2E7
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.ualberta.ca/~brigandt
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