Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1073885
 
 

References (45)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Rethinking the Fairness Hypothesis: Procedural Justice in Simple Bargaining Games


Mikhael Shor


University of Connecticut Department of Economics

December 2007


Abstract:     
I consider two new simple bargaining games in which two players bargain over division of a fixed amount of money. Both games are strategically equivalent to the dictator game, in that one player has the unilateral ability to determine the allocation. However, that player can instead choose to share decision-making power with the other. In this way, I take a broader view of fairness than past experiments, considering both distributive justice (how much I get) and procedural justice (the rules governing how I get it). First, players often decide to empower the other player, even though there is no strategic reason to do so, implying an innate concern with procedural justice. Second, divisions in these games are much more equitable than in traditional dictator games, suggesting that a fair procedure may elicit fair distribution. Thus, past rejection of the fairness hypothesis (arguing that fairness concerns would lead to similar distributions in the ultimatum and dictator games) may be due to a failure to account for fairness as both a distributive and procedural concern.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: justice, fairness, ultimatum, dictator, bargaining

JEL Classification: C78, C92, D63

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 17, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Shor, Mikhael, Rethinking the Fairness Hypothesis: Procedural Justice in Simple Bargaining Games (December 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1073885 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1073885

Contact Information

Mikhael Shor (Contact Author)
University of Connecticut Department of Economics ( email )
341 Mansfield Road
Storrs, CT 06269
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.mikeshor.com/
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,178
Downloads: 529
Download Rank: 27,886
References:  45
Citations:  3

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.266 seconds