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Contracts and Money


Boyan Jovanovic


New York University - Department of Economics

Masako Ueda


University of Wisconsin, Madison - School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 105, No. 4 (August 1997)

Abstract:     
Why are contracts not fully indexed? In a setting in which fully indexed contracts are feasible, we find that when price-level data are gathered with delay, these contracts are not renegotiation-proof. The contracts that replace them entail a lower level of welfare for the parties to that contract. They also imply that real variables respond to nominal shocks.

JEL Classification: D82, D39, E24

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: September 1, 1997  

Suggested Citation

Jovanovic, Boyan and Ueda, Masako, Contracts and Money. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 105, No. 4 (August 1997). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=10751

Contact Information

Boyan Jovanovic (Contact Author)
New York University - Department of Economics ( email )
19 w 4 st.
New York, NY 10012
United States
Masako Ueda
University of Wisconsin, Madison - School of Business ( email )
975 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53706
United States
608-262-3656 (Phone)
608-265-4195 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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