Abstract

 
 

References (53)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Empirical Evidence on the New International Aid Architecture


Stijn Claessens


International Monetary Fund (IMF); University of Amsterdam - Finance Group; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Danny Cassimon


University of Antwerp - Institute for Development Policy and Management

Bjorn Van Camperhout


affiliation not provided to SSRN

December 2007

IMF Working Paper No. 07/277

Abstract:     
We study how 22 donors allocate their bilateral aid among 147 recipient countries over the 1970-2004 period to investigate whether changes in the international aid architecture - at the international and country level - have led to changes in behavior. We find that after the fall of the Berlin wall, and especially in the late nineties, bilateral aid responds more to economic need and the quality of a recipient country's policy and institutional environment and less to debt, size, and colonial linkages. Importantly, we find that when a country uses a PRSP and passes the HIPC decision point the perverse effect of large bilateral and multilateral debt shares on aid flows is reduced, suggesting less defensive lending. Overall, it appears international aid architecture changes have led to more selectivity in aid allocations. The specific factors causing these changes remain unclear, however. Furthermore, there remain large differences among donors in selectivity that appear to relate to donors' own institutional environments. Together this suggests that further reforms will have to be multifaceted.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: Working Paper

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 21, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Claessens, Stijn, Cassimon, Danny and Van Camperhout, Bjorn, Empirical Evidence on the New International Aid Architecture (December 2007). IMF Working Papers, Vol. , pp. 1-53, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1075893

Contact Information

Stijn Claessens (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-7641 (Phone)
202-5897641 (Fax)
University of Amsterdam - Finance Group ( email )
Roetersstraat 18
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 6020 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5285 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/fm/index.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Danny Cassimon
University of Antwerp - Institute for Development Policy and Management ( email )
Prinsstraat 13
Antwerpen, B-2000
Belgium
Bjorn Van Camperhout
affiliation not provided to SSRN
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 295
Downloads: 54
Download Rank: 84,984
References:  53
Citations:  4

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 1.438 seconds