Charity Auctions: A Field Experiment
Jeffrey P. Carpenter
Middlebury College - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Peter Hans Matthews
Middlebury College - Department of Economics
The Economic Journal, Vol. 118, No. 525, pp. 92-113, January 2008
Auctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. We conduct field experiments to see which sealed bid format, first price, second price or all-pay, raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both the all-pay and second price formats are dominated by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the difference between existing theory and the field.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 23, 2007
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