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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079504
 
 

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The Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates


Gianluca Faella


Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton; University of Bologna

October 11, 2007


Abstract:     
Loyalty discounts lie at the heart of the debate on single firm conduct, probably the most controversial issue in contemporary antitrust practice. Under particular conditions, loyalty discounts may have an exclusionary effect. However, they constitute a classical form of price competition, an effective commercial tool and a way to solve coordination problems in the production chain. In the United States, the fear to lessen price competition has led to a very strong presumption of legality of discounts, provided that they are not predatory or bundled. In the EU, the tendency to induce loyalty, if not a mere intent to exclude rivals, is traditionally deemed to be enough to justify the prohibition of the practice. In the paper, it is submitted that the opposite (almost) per se rules prevailing on the two sides of the Atlantic should be set aside. A detailed analysis, based on a suitable price-cost test and a careful assessment of the impact of the practice on the competitive capacity of minor rivals and on the overall degree of competition in the market concerned, would allow to intervene in cases of seriously exclusionary discount policies, while limiting the unnecessary prohibition of effective forms of price competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Antitrust, Abuse of dominant position, discounts, rebates

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L41, L42

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Date posted: January 1, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Faella, Gianluca, The Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates (October 11, 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079504 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1079504

Contact Information

Gianluca Faella (Contact Author)
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton ( email )
Rome
Italy
00390669522690 (Phone)
University of Bologna ( email )
Via Zamboni, 33
Bologna, Bologna
Italy
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