Footnotes (333)



Falsity, Insincerity and the Freedom of Expression

Mark Spottswood

Florida State University College of Law

Three decades ago, the Supreme Court announced that false statements of fact are devoid of constitutional value, without providing either a reasoned explanation for that principle or any supporting citations. Since then, this assertion has become one of the most frequently repeated dogmas of First Amendment law and theory, endlessly repeated and never challenged. Disturbingly, this idea has provided the theoretic foundation for a regime in which some speakers can be penalized for even honestly-believed factual errors. Even worse, this dogma is flat wrong.

False statements have value in themselves, and we should protect them even in situations where we are not concerned with chilling truthful speech. When false statements are spoken sincerely, they are a useful and necessary part of argumentation, which is a powerful means of increasing human knowledge. When confronted with honest errors, proponents of competing beliefs have a natural impulse to contest them; in so doing, they unearth and disseminate facts that deepen the understanding of both speakers and listeners. False speech, therefore, is valuable because it is an essential part of a larger system that works to increase society's knowledge.

The benefits of false speech evaporate, however, when we move from honest errors to deliberate lies. Insincere speech tends to corrode, rather than further, argument. It is associated with a number of practices that deprive argument of its knowledge-promoting features. We may sometimes wish to protect insincere speech to avoid chilling truthful speech, but we should always do so cautiously.

After providing a summary of the existing law and scholarship concerning false speech, this article analyzes the harms and benefits of false, insincere and misleading speech. This question will be approached from the perspective of social veritistic epistemology, in an attempt to assess the consequences of various types of deceptive speech for the state of societal knowledge. I will conclude by suggesting some ways in which existing First Amendment doctrine could be reformed in order to better account for the constitutional value of false speech. Ultimately, it is insincerity, not falsity, which has "no essential part of any exposition of ideas," and is of "slight social value as a step to truth." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 78

Keywords: Free Speech, Speech and Press, False, Insincere, Lies, Fraud, Misleading, Deceptive, First Amendment, Epistemology, Social Veritistic Epistemology, Implicature

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: January 14, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Spottswood, Mark, Falsity, Insincerity and the Freedom of Expression. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081630 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081630

Contact Information

Mark Spottswood (Contact Author)
Florida State University College of Law ( email )
425 W. Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32306
United States

Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,225
Downloads: 160
Download Rank: 82,669
Footnotes:  333

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.344 seconds