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Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution


Daniel A. Farber


University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

January 9, 2008

Arizona Law Review, Vol. 50, p. 851, 2008
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1081664
Energy Center Research Paper No. 12-03

Abstract:     
The federal government so far has shown little initiative in addressing the issue of climate change. Perhaps surprisingly, however, state governments have moved much more aggressively. By 2006, every state had taken steps of some kind to address climate change. California has been the leader, with legislation aimed at reducing greenhouse emissions from automobiles and electrical generators, as well as an ambitious mandate to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by the end of the next decade.

Federal climate change legislation seems increasingly likely, but at least some states are likely to continue pursuing independent initiatives. Courts, state governments, and the EPA will then be faced with the question of how much room remains for state climate regulations.

This Article argues for a bifurcated approach to the constitutional authority of states to pursue climate change mitigation. Courts should reject regulations that violate clear statutory preemption clauses, discriminate against interstate commerce, ban transactions under federal cap-and-trade schemes, or directly interfere with international agreements. In the remaining cases, the Article advocates adoption of a strong presumption of validity for state climate change regulation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: climate change, federalism, environment, preemption

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Date posted: January 11, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Farber, Daniel A., Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution (January 9, 2008). Arizona Law Review, Vol. 50, p. 851, 2008; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1081664; Energy Center Research Paper No. 12-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081664 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081664

Contact Information

Daniel A. Farber (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
Boalt Hall
Room 894
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-642-0340 (Phone)
510-642-3728 (Fax)
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