Abstract

 
 

References (30)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Politics and Procurement: Evidence from Cleaning Contracts


Ari Hyytinen


University of Jyväskylä - School of Business and Economics

Sofia Lundberg


University of Umea - Department of Economics

Otto Toivanen


KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FBE); CEPR

November 1, 2007

HECER Discussion Paper No. 196

Abstract:     
We study the effects of politics on public procurement in Swedish municipalities in 1990-98 using data on cleaning services. No procuring municipality committed to a standard auction format or to an explicit scoring rule. Political identity of the governing party is not correlated with the decision to procure, the decision to restrict entry, or the number of invited firms. However, left-wing municipalities are more likely not to invite "in-house firms". In our data, the lowest bidder does not win 58% of the time, and conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the municipalities end up paying a premium of 43%. Our discrete choice analysis shows that while all municipalities are price sensitive, left-wing councils 1.5 as price sensitive as right-wing councils. Conditional on bids, left-wing councils are more likely to choose a local firm. Politics thus matter and affect procurement outcomes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Efficiency, favoritism, politics, public procurement

JEL Classification: H57, D44, P16

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: January 14, 2008 ; Last revised: August 13, 2009

Suggested Citation

Hyytinen, Ari, Lundberg, Sofia and Toivanen, Otto, Politics and Procurement: Evidence from Cleaning Contracts (November 1, 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1082817

Contact Information

Ari Hyytinen
University of Jyvaskyla - School of Business and Economics ( email )
PO Box 35
PO Box 35 FIN-40014 University of Jyväskylä
FIN 40351, FIN-40014
Finland
Sofia Lundberg
University of Umea - Department of Economics ( email )
Umeå University
Umea, SE - 90187
Sweden
Otto Toivanen (Contact Author)
KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FBE) ( email )
Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
CEPR ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 880
Downloads: 116
Download Rank: 121,174
References:  30
Citations:  4

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.328 seconds