Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1083835
 
 

References (39)



 
 

Citations (12)



 


 



Click Fraud


Kenneth C. Wilbur


University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Yi Zhu


University of Minnesota - Carlson School of Management



Abstract:     
Click fraud is the practice of deceptively clicking on search ads with the intention of either increasing third-party website revenues or exhausting an advertiser's budget. Search advertisers are forced to trust that search engines do everything possible to detect and prevent click fraud even though the engines get paid for every undetected fraudulent click. We seek to answer whether it is in a search engine's interest to prevent click fraud.

We find that, under full information in a second price auction, if x% of clicks are fraudulent, advertisers will lower their bids by x%, leaving the auction outcome and search engine revenues unchanged. However, if we allow for uncertainty in the amount of click fraud or change the auction mechanism to include a click-through component, search engine revenues may rise or fall with click fraud. A decrease occurs when the keyword auction is relatively competitive, as advertisers lower their budgets to hedge against downside risk. If the keyword auction is less competitive, click fraud may transfer surplus from the winning advertiser to the search engine. This last result suggests that the search advertising industry may benefit from using a neutral third party to audit search engines' click fraud detection algorithms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Advertising, Auctions, Click Fraud, Game Theory, Internet, Marketing, Search Advertising

JEL Classification: M31, M37, L86

working papers series





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Date posted: January 15, 2008 ; Last revised: June 19, 2014

Suggested Citation

Wilbur, Kenneth C. and Zhu, Yi, Click Fraud. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1083835 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1083835

Contact Information

Kenneth C. Wilbur
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States
HOME PAGE: http://kennethcwilbur.com
Yi Zhu (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Carlson School of Management ( email )
321 - 19th Ave. South, Suite 3-150
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
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