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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084106
 
 

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Weyerhaeuser, Predatory Bidding, and Error Costs


Keith N. Hylton


Boston University - School of Law


Antitrust Bulletin, 2008
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-03

Abstract:     
In Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons the Supreme Court held that the predatory pricing standard adopted in Brooke Group also applies to predatory bidding claims, because the two types of predation are "analytically similar". I argue that predatory bidding is likely to be more harmful to consumer welfare than is predatory pricing. Successful input market predation may lead to a "dual market power" outcome in which the firm has market power in both the input and the output market. In spite of the analytical distinction, consideration of error costs leads me to conclude that Brooke Group remains the best standard to apply to predatory bidding claims.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons, predatory pricing standard, predatory bidding, Brooke Group

JEL Classification: K21, K00

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Date posted: January 17, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., Weyerhaeuser, Predatory Bidding, and Error Costs. Antitrust Bulletin, 2008; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084106

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
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