Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-Taking
Viral V. Acharya
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
New York University - Stern School of Business
Lubomir P. Litov
University of Oklahoma - Michael F. Price College of Business; University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center
March 5, 2008
We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy reduce corporate risk-taking. Employing country-level data, we find that strong creditor rights are associated with a greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying mergers, and this propensity changes in response to changes in the country creditor rights. Also, in countries with stronger creditor rights companies' operating risk is lower, and acquirers with low-recovery assets prefer targets with high-recovery assets. These relationships are strongest in countries where management is dismissed in reorganization, suggesting an agency-cost effect. Our results suggest that there might be a "dark" side to strong creditor rights in that they can induce costly risk avoidance in corporate policies. Thus, stronger creditor rights may not necessarily be optimal.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Keywords: international mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy code, reorganization, risk taking
JEL Classification: G31, G32, G33, G34
Date posted: January 18, 2008
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