Abstract

 
 

References (32)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Foreign Takeovers and Wage Dispersion in Hungary


Sandor Csengödi


Government of Hungary - National Development Office

Dieter M. Urban


Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz - Institute for International Economic Theory; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

January 2008

CESifo Working Paper No. 2188

Abstract:     
This study tests FDI technology spillover models with the assumption that learning takes time against wage bargaining models by estimating the wage-premium of a foreign takeover. The technology spillover theory predicts a larger wage growth in firms taken over by foreign investors than in local firms. However, this wage growth should be confined to high-skilled workers or workers with a high level of education. Wage bargaining models also predict such a wage growth. But it should be confined to workers who are organized in trade unions, i.e. workers with low or medium level of education or skill. We apply Hungarian employee-employer matched data from 1992 until 2001, and reject the FDI technology spillover model in favor of the wage bargaining model when differentiating the wage premium by education or occupation, both by applying Mincer wage regressions and the nearest-neighbor matching method.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: FDI, foreign takeover, cross-border M&A, Mincer wage regression, employee-employer matched data, nearest-neighbor matching

JEL Classification: E24, F16, F23

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: January 21, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Csengödi, Sandor and Urban, Dieter M., Foreign Takeovers and Wage Dispersion in Hungary (January 2008). CESifo Working Paper No. 2188. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1085976

Contact Information

Sandor Csengödi
Government of Hungary - National Development Office ( email )
Bozsonyi ut 56
Budapest, 1133
Hungary
Dieter M. Urban (Contact Author)
Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz - Institute for International Economic Theory ( email )
D 55099 Mainz
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 227
Downloads: 26
References:  32
Citations:  1

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.579 seconds