Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086453
 
 

Citations (10)



 


 



Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law


Jeffrey N. Gordon


Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 60, p. 347, 1991
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 324

Abstract:     
By longstanding practice, shareholders of large public corporations have delegated almost all decision rights over business matters to the board of directors. Given current calls for shareholder empowerment, it is worth revisiting the basis for the existing practice, as reflected in this 1991 paper. Among other things, we see that this absolute delegation rule minimizes potential pathologies in shareholder voting, including possibilities for opportunistic side-dealings and destructive voting cycles. These risks must be addressed lest shareholder empowerment merely replace one set of problems with another.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: January 23, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Gordon, Jeffrey N., Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law. University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 60, p. 347, 1991; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 324. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086453

Contact Information

Jeffrey N. Gordon (Contact Author)
Columbia Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
Ctr. for Law and Economic Studies
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-2316 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,319
Downloads: 287
Download Rank: 61,720
Citations:  10

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.360 seconds