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Horses for Courses: Fund Managers and Organizational Structures


Yufeng Han


University of Colorado at Denver - Business School

Michael J. Rebello


University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Thomas H. Noe


University of Oxford - Said Business School; University of Oxford - Balliol College; European Corporate Governance Institute

January 22, 2008

Second Singapore International Conference on Finance 2008

Abstract:     
This paper considers the team management of mutual funds, fund manager ability, fund performance, and holdings. We find evidence suggesting a positive relation between fund performance and team management concurrent with a negative relation between managerial ability and the use of team management. Consistent with the notion that team management suppresses portfolio eccentricity and leads to more generic trading strategies, thereby both increasing returns and making returns less informative of fund manager ability, we also find that team management is associated with less idiosyncratic portfolio holdings and a greater loading on large capitalization, low book-to-market, and momentum stocks.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: Team Management, Fund Performance, Self Selection

JEL Classification: G29

working papers series


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Date posted: March 4, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Han, Yufeng, Rebello, Michael J. and Noe, Thomas H., Horses for Courses: Fund Managers and Organizational Structures (January 22, 2008). Second Singapore International Conference on Finance 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1086542

Contact Information

Yufeng Han (Contact Author)
University of Colorado at Denver - Business School ( email )
1475 Lawrence St.
Denver, CO 80204
United States
303-3158458 (Phone)
Michael J. Rebello
University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States
Thomas H. Noe
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom
University of Oxford - Balliol College ( email )
Broad St
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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