Using Internal Incentive Contracts to Improve Water Utility Performance: The Case of Uganda's NWSC

Water Policy, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 271-84

16 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2008 Last revised: 3 Feb 2009

See all articles by Silver Mugisha

Silver Mugisha

National Water and Sewerage Corporation

Sanford V. Berg

University of Florida - Department of Economics

William T. Muhairwe

National Water and Sewerage Corporation

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

The achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) by 2015 requires significant managerial innovation and creativity, especially in low-income countries where utility inefficiencies are still prevalent. This paper describes approaches that have been used in Uganda's National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC). We outline the potential for internal incentive contracts in delivering efficiency gains under public-public water management settings. No simple recipe exists for promoting efficiency. However, this article highlights useful ingredients, including proper contract framework design, competition for managerial responsibility, effective business planning, performance monitoring and the use of managerial incentives. We conclude that these factors require careful consideration during the planning and implementation of incentive contracts.

Suggested Citation

Mugisha, Silver and Berg, Sanford V. and Muhairwe, William T., Using Internal Incentive Contracts to Improve Water Utility Performance: The Case of Uganda's NWSC (2007). Water Policy, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 271-84, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1088146

Silver Mugisha

National Water and Sewerage Corporation ( email )

Plot 23, Jinja Road
PO Box 7053
Kampala-Uganda
Uganda

Sanford V. Berg (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Department of Economics ( email )

Gainesville, FL 32611-7140
United States
352-392-0132 (Phone)
352-392-7796 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cba.ufl.edu/purc/facultyinfo.asp?WEBID=1260

William T. Muhairwe

National Water and Sewerage Corporation ( email )

Plot 23, Jinja Road
PO Box 7053
Kampala-Uganda
Uganda

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