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Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Southwestern University Law Review, Forthcoming
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-05

Deterrence and compensation goals should be distinguished, and compensation priorities should change in response to the deterrence goal. This has immediate implications for the problem of handling marginal and fraudulent claims in asbestos litigation. Where the deterrence goals come to the forefront, for example in instances of reckless exposure, it may be desirable for courts to require defendants to pay damages that are not transferred to any claimants. Where the deterrence goals are less compelling, as in instances of ordinary negligence, the importance of weeding out marginal and fraudulent claims becomes paramount. I consider optimal penalties for attorneys who bundle fraudulent claims.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: asbestos litigation, deterrence goals, compensation goals, marginal and fraudulent claims, bundling of fraudulent claims

JEL Classification: K00, K4, K13

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Date posted: January 31, 2008 ; Last revised: March 24, 2008

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims. Southwestern University Law Review, Forthcoming; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088399

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
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