Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
Southwestern University Law Review, Forthcoming
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-05
Deterrence and compensation goals should be distinguished, and compensation priorities should change in response to the deterrence goal. This has immediate implications for the problem of handling marginal and fraudulent claims in asbestos litigation. Where the deterrence goals come to the forefront, for example in instances of reckless exposure, it may be desirable for courts to require defendants to pay damages that are not transferred to any claimants. Where the deterrence goals are less compelling, as in instances of ordinary negligence, the importance of weeding out marginal and fraudulent claims becomes paramount. I consider optimal penalties for attorneys who bundle fraudulent claims.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19
Keywords: asbestos litigation, deterrence goals, compensation goals, marginal and fraudulent claims, bundling of fraudulent claims
JEL Classification: K00, K4, K13Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: January 31, 2008 ; Last revised: March 24, 2008
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.250 seconds