An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers
Tulane University - Department of Finance
February 4, 2008
Management Science, Forthcoming
AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper
We investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for a large sample of vertical takeovers. The efficiency rationale posits that vertical integration prevents future holdup between non-integrated suppliers and customers. In contrast, the foreclosure and collusion rationales suggest that vertical integration harms competition. To distinguish between these hypotheses, we examine the announcement period wealth effects of the merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and corporate customers. Our results suggest that firms alter their vertical boundaries in a manner that is consistent with the efficiency rationale. Our tests do not find evidence supportive of the anti-competitive rationales for vertical integration.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 56
Keywords: Vertical Integration, Vertical Mergers, Takeovers, Efficiency, Collusion, Foreclosure
JEL Classification: G34, D43, K21, L40Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 4, 2008 ; Last revised: May 22, 2013
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