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Entrenchment and Changes in Performance Following CEO Turnover
Cristian L. Dezso University of Maryland - R.H. Smith School of Business December 19, 2007 Atlanta Competitive Advantage Conference Paper Robert H. Smith School Research Paper No. RHS 06-103 Abstract: I investigate whether CEO turnovers - forced, as well as voluntary - are accompanied by changes in firm performance, and whether governance provisions associated with managerial entrenchment affect these changes. Using data on CEO turnovers in the 800 largest U.S. companies occurring over the period 1980-2000, I present evidence that firms with entrenched CEOs exhibit significantly poorer performance in the year prior to forced turnover, and experience significantly larger performance improvements during the three years following forced turnover. More importantly, I show that these larger performance improvements are the result of improved management rather than mean reversion. This evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis that entrenchment hampers firm performance by protecting inferior CEOs.
Keywords: Entrenchment, Corporate governance, CEO turnover, Firm performance JEL Classifications: G30, G34 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: January 31, 2008 ; Last revised: November 11, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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