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Is a Team Different from the Sum of its Parts? Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers

Michaela Baer
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Alexander Kempf
University of Cologne - Department of Finance; University of Cologne - Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Stefan Ruenzi
University of Mannheim - Department of International Finance


February 2009


Abstract:     
This paper provides the first empirical test of the diversification of opinion theory and the group shift theory using real business data. Our data set covers management teams and single managers of US equity mutual funds. Our results reject the group shift theory and support the diversification of opinion theory: extreme opinions of single team managers average out and, consequently, teams take less extreme decisions than individuals do. We find that teams follow less extreme investment styles than single managers and that teams are eventually less likely to achieve extreme performance outcomes. These results hold after taking into account the impact of fund characteristics and team characteristics.

Keywords: Mutual Funds, Team Management, Investment Behaviour

JEL Classifications: G23, M54

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 05, 2008 ; Last revised: February 17, 2009

Suggested Citation

Baer, Michaela, Kempf, Alexander and Ruenzi, Stefan, Is a Team Different from the Sum of its Parts? Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers (February 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089207


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Contact Information

Stefan Ruenzi (Contact Author)
University of Mannheim - Department of International Finance ( email )
L9, 1-2
Mannheim 68131
Germany
Michaela Baer
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR) ( email )
50923 Cologne Germany
+49 (0)221 470 7709 (Phone)
+49 (0)221 470 3992 (Fax)
Alexander Kempf
University of Cologne - Department of Finance ( email )
50923 Cologne Germany
+49 221 470 2714 (Phone)
+49 221 470 3992 (Fax)
University of Cologne - Centre for Financial Research (CFR) ( email )
Albertus-Magnus Platz
Cologne 50923
Germany
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