Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries
Douglas G. Smith
Kirkland & Ellis LLP; Loyola University Chicago School of Law; American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
February 1, 2008
Brigham Young University Law Review, Vol. 2008, No. 4, 2008
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-08
This article addresses the theoretical justifications for limited liability and the exceptions to limited liability under the various veil piercing doctrines. In particular, the article considers whether veil piercing is appropriate in regulated industries such as insurance and banking, which have comprehensive regulatory structures that are designed to prevent much of the conduct that veil piercing is designed to remedy. The article concludes that veil piercing is not justified under such circumstances because the economic costs outweigh any benefits.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: piercing the corporate veil, limited liability, corporate veil, corporationsAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 6, 2008 ; Last revised: December 15, 2008
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