Citations (3)


Footnotes (76)



Hands-Off Options

Jesse M. Fried

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

June 24, 2011

Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 61, pp. 453-474, 2008
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1091068

Despite recent reforms, public company executives can still use inside information to time their stock sales, secretly boosting their pay. They can also still inflate the stock price before selling. Such insider trading and price manipulation imposes large costs on shareholders. This paper suggests that executives' options be cashed out according to a pre-specified, gradual schedule. These hands-off options would substantially reduce the costs associated with current equity arrangements while imposing little burden on executives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 1

Keywords: Executive compensation, stock options, insider trading, earnings manipulation

JEL Classification: G34, G38, J33, K22, M52

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: February 7, 2008 ; Last revised: June 24, 2011

Suggested Citation

Fried, Jesse M., Hands-Off Options (June 24, 2011). Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 61, pp. 453-474, 2008; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1091068. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091068

Contact Information

Jesse M. Fried (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Griswold Hall 506
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-384-8158 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10289/Fried
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
B-1050 Brussels
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,049
Downloads: 301
Download Rank: 66,967
Citations:  3
Footnotes:  76
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.328 seconds