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The Divergence of Legal Procedures


Aron Balas


National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Florencio Lopez de Silanes


EDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute

Rafael La Porta


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
2/1/08


Abstract:     
Djankov et al. (2003a) propose and measure for 109 countries in the year 2000 an index of formalism of legal procedure for two simple disputes: eviction of a non-paying tenant and collection of a bounced check. For a sub-sample of 40 countries, we compute this index every year starting in 1950, which allows us to study the evolution of legal rules. We find that between 1950 and 2000, the formalism of legal procedure did not converge, and possibly diverged, between common law and French civil law countries. At least in this specific area of law, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that national legal systems are converging, and support the view that legal origins exert long lasting influence on legal rules.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: common law, civil law, legal procedure, formalism

JEL Classification: K4, K41, P51

working papers series


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Date posted: February 12, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Balas, Aron, Lopez de Silanes, Florencio, La Porta, Rafael and Shleifer, Andrei, The Divergence of Legal Procedures (2/1/08). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091232 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1091232

Contact Information

Aron Balas
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Florencio Lopez de Silanes
EDHEC Business School ( email )
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
Nice, 06202
France
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07 (Phone)
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Andrei Shleifer (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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