Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092250
 
 

References (38)



 
 

Citations (17)



 


 



Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms


Andrew Ellul


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

Marco Pagano


University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Fausto Panunzi


Bocconi University - Department of Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

November 30, 2009

3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 222/2008

Abstract:     
Entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,004 firms from 38 countries in 1990-2006, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, but does not affect investment in non-family firms. Moreover, as the model predicts, inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 64

Keywords: succession, family firms, inheritance law, growth, investment

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G38

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 16, 2008 ; Last revised: May 12, 2014

Suggested Citation

Ellul, Andrew and Pagano, Marco and Panunzi, Fausto, Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms (November 30, 2009). 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 222/2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092250 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1092250

Contact Information

Andrew Ellul
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )
1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Marco Pagano (Contact Author)
University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )
Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy
+39 081 675306 (Phone)
+39 081 7663540 (Fax)
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)
Via Sallustiana, 62
Rome, 00187
Italy
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org
Fausto Panunzi
Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
20136 Milan
Italy
+39 02 5836 5327 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 5343 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,063
Downloads: 410
Download Rank: 25,537
References:  38
Citations:  17
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.219 seconds