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Principal-Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation


Yiyi Su


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Dean Xu


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Phillip Phan


Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

Management and Organization Review, Vol. 4, Issue 1, pp. 17-38, March 2008

Abstract:     
By examining the level of ownership concentration across firms, we determine how principal-principal conflict, defined as the incongruence of ownership goals among shareholder groups in a corporation, impacts agency costs of Chinese boards of directors. Based on data from Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 1999-2003, we found that ownership concentration had a U-shaped relationship with board compensation, board size and the presence of independent directors. These results provide corroborating evidence that principal-principal conflict can lead to high agency costs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: February 18, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Su, Yiyi, Xu, Dean and Phan, Phillip H., Principal-Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation. Management and Organization Review, Vol. 4, Issue 1, pp. 17-38, March 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093063 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2007.00090.x

Contact Information

Yiyi Su (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Dean Xu
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Phillip H. Phan
Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )
100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202-1099
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  62
Citations:  5

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