Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094568
 
 

References (18)



 
 

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Supranational Agency: A Solution for Conflict in International Mergers?


Poonam Singh


National Institute of Securities Markets

January 2, 2008


Abstract:     
Conflict between national antitrust or competition laws is likely to increase with the increase in global integration. In this paper we develop a two-country, three-firm model to analyze the possibilities of conflict between national antitrust authorities, using the welfare criteria. We show that if countries maximize their national welfare there is a likelihood of conflict resulting at times in obstruction of welfare-enhancing mergers. We show that shifting to either a global welfare or consumer surplus standard can resolve conflicts but may not always lead to an efficient outcome. To achieve efficiency, transfer payments are required. We argue that there is a scope for institutions like WTO to assume the role of supranational authority in cross border merger cases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Conflict, Cross border merger, Efficiency, Welfare, Standardization

JEL Classification: D74, F51, L4

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Date posted: February 19, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Singh, Poonam, Supranational Agency: A Solution for Conflict in International Mergers? (January 2, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094568 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1094568

Contact Information

Poonam Mehra (Contact Author)
National Institute of Securities Markets ( email )
Plot No. 82, Sector - 17
Vashi, Navi Mumbai, 400 705
India
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Download Rank: 154,351
References:  18
Citations:  1

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