Collective Lobbying in Politics: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Sweden
Uppsala University - Department of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
January 21, 2009
Uppsala University Working Paper No. 2008:2
This paper first presents a model of how local government politicians lobby to raise intergovernmental grants to their local governments. The model identifies an effect of council size on grants received. This relationship is then studied empirically. I find a large negative effect of council size on grants received producing a “group size paradox”. The effect could be explained by free-riding incentives in individual lobbying effort contribution among local government politicians which arise due to a collective action problem. This pattern provides indirect evidence for the occurrence of intergovernmental lobbying.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37
Keywords: lobbying, rent-seeking, collective action problem, group size paradox, intergovernmental grants, local governments, regression discontinuity
JEL Classification: D72, D73, D78, H71, H72, H73, H77working papers series
Date posted: February 26, 2008 ; Last revised: August 11, 2009
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.359 seconds