Fiscal Crisis and Institutional Change in the Ottoman Empire and France
Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Noel D. Johnson
George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center
February 19, 2008
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 69, pp. 809-845, 2009
Why is it that some countries adopted growth enhancing institutions earlier than others during the early-modern period? We address this question through a comparative study of the evolution of French and Ottoman fiscal institutions. During the sixteenth century both countries made extensive use of tax farming to collect revenue, however, uncertain property rights caused by fiscal pressure led to different paths of institutional change in each state. In France, tax collectors successfully overcame the collective action costs of imposing constraint on the king. In the Ottoman Empire, tax collectors faced prohibitive transaction costs to organizing in a similar manner.
Keywords: Tax Farming, Economic History, Early-Modern France, Ottoman Empire
JEL Classification: N40, P48, H11
Date posted: February 24, 2008 ; Last revised: March 20, 2012
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.359 seconds