Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Woochan Kim

Woochan Kim

Korea University Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Asian Institute of Corporate Governance (AICG)

Bernard S. Black

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law

Hasung Jang

Korea University - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2006

Abstract

We report strong OLS and instrumental variable evidence that an overall corporate governance index is an important and likely causal factor in explaining the market value of Korean public companies. We construct a corporate governance index (KCGI, 0~100) for 515 Korean companies based on a 2001 Korea Stock Exchange survey. In OLS, a worst-to-best change in KCGI predicts a 0.47 increase in Tobin's q (about a 160% increase in share price). This effect is statistically strong (t = 6.12) and robust to choice of market value variable (Tobin's q, market/book, and market/sales), specification of the governance index, and inclusion of extensive control variables. We rely on unique features of Korean legal rules to construct an instrument for KCGI. Good instruments are not available in other comparable studies. Two-stage and three-stage least squares coefficients are larger than OLS coefficients and are highly significant. Thus, this article offers evidence consistent with a causal relationship between an overall governance index and higher share prices in emerging markets. We also find that Korean firms with 50% outside directors have 0.13 higher Tobin's q (roughly 40% higher share price), after controlling for the rest of KCGI. This effect, too, is likely causal. Thus, we report the first evidence consistent with greater board independence causally predicting higher share prices in emerging markets.

Suggested Citation

Kim, Woochan and Black, Bernard S. and Jang, Hasung, Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea (October 2006). The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 22, Issue 2, pp. 366-413, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1098690 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewj018

Woochan Kim

Korea University Business School ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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1000 Brussels
Belgium

Asian Institute of Corporate Governance (AICG) ( email )

1, 5-ga, Anam-dong
Sungbuk-gu
Seoul, 136-701
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Bernard S. Black (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-2784 (Phone)

Hasung Jang

Korea University - Department of Finance ( email )

Seoul, 136-701
United States

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