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How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios?


Allen N. Berger


University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business; Wharton Financial Institutions Center; Tilburg University - CentER

Robert DeYoung


University of Kansas School of Business

Mark J. Flannery


University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

David K. Lee


Government of the United States of America - Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)

Özde Öztekin


Florida International University

February 1, 2008

Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 34, No. 2-3, 2008

Abstract:     
U.S. banks hold significantly more equity capital than required by their regulators. We test competing hypotheses regarding the reasons for this “excess” capital, using an innovative partial adjustment approach that allows estimated BHC-specific capital targets and adjustment speeds to vary with firm-specific characteristics. We apply the model to annual panel data for publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from 1992 through 2006, an extended period of increasing bank capital that ended just before the subprime credit crisis of 2007–2008. The evidence suggests that BHCs actively managed their capital ratios (as opposed to passively allowing capital to build up via retained earnings), set target capital levels substantially above well-capitalized regulatory minima, and (especially poorly capitalized BHCs) made rapid adjustments toward their targets.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Banks, Capital management, Capital regulation, Partial adjustment models

JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: February 27, 2008 ; Last revised: February 6, 2011

Suggested Citation

Berger, Allen N., DeYoung, Robert, Flannery , Mark J., Lee, David K. and Öztekin, Özde, How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios? (February 1, 2008). Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 34, No. 2-3, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1098928

Contact Information

Allen N. Berger (Contact Author)
University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business ( email )
Francis M. Hipp Building
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-576-8440 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)
Wharton Financial Institutions Center
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367
United States
Tilburg University - CentER
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands
Robert DeYoung
University of Kansas School of Business ( email )
Summerfield Hall
1300 Sunnyside Avenue
Lawrence, KS 66045
United States
785-864-1806 (Phone)
Mark Jeffrey Flannery
University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ( email )
P.O. Box 117168
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States
352-392-3184 (Phone)
352-392-0103 (Fax)
David K. Lee
Government of the United States of America - Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) ( email )
550 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20429
United States
Özde Öztekin
Florida International University ( email )
Miami, FL 33327
United States
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