Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1099382
 
 

Footnotes (3)



 


 



Asset Specificity and Transaction Structures: A Case Study of @Home Corporation


Brian J. M. Quinn


BC Law School

March 3, 2009

Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Forthcoming
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 354

Abstract:     
This is a case study of a class of transaction that is well understood in the context of economic theory but that is under-analyzed empirically. Asset specific investments present special contractual challenges. Because specific investments are particular to a single location, use or customer, their next best use is of much lower value than the use for which they are initially proposed. Consequently, asset specific investments face the threat of ex post opportunism leading to a potential allocative inefficiency. This contracting problem is particularly difficult where firms that are otherwise rivals must coordinate individual specific investments in order to create a valuable shared resource. In such cases, generating credible expectations of cooperation among rivals is critical to coordinating these investments. The case of @Home is an example of how rivals were able to employ 'hybrid' structures including contractual safeguards, including joint ownership, specialized governance devices, and economic lock-in, to overcome the problem of asset specificity and then build out a nationwide cable-based online service network during the 1990's. As the market developed alternatives to the @Home service and the technologies and assets of @Home became less specific the economic lock-in required to hold the venture together failed to materialize and @Home collapsed. The ultimate failure of @Home points out that strategies to provide the proper ex ante incentives many not always be durable, leaving contracting parties with less than perfect options.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Deals, asset specificity, moral hazard

JEL Classification: K00

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 3, 2008 ; Last revised: November 13, 2009

Suggested Citation

Quinn, Brian J. M., Asset Specificity and Transaction Structures: A Case Study of @Home Corporation (March 3, 2009). Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Forthcoming; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 354. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1099382

Contact Information

Brian J. M. Quinn (Contact Author)
BC Law School ( email )
885 Centre Street
Newton, MA 02459-1163
United States

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,545
Downloads: 163
Download Rank: 107,268
Footnotes:  3

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.265 seconds