Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101746
 
 

Footnotes (86)



 


 



Privatization of State Administrative Services


Drury D. Stevenson


South Texas College of Law

August 6, 2008

Louisiana Law Review, Vol. 68, p. 114, 2008

Abstract:     
Privatization of government services has been touted as a cost-savings approach for state agencies, promising to harness the efficiencies of market forces to overcome the perceived inefficiencies of bureaucracies. Empirical and anecdotal evidence indicates that such savings rarely materialize, and instead outsourcing is often a bad deal for taxpayers. This paper explores the inherent problems in the contractual arrangements for these attempts at government outsourcing. Perverse incentives, transaction costs, non-competitive bidding, the nature of government services handled on the state level, and conflicting legal rules regarding interpretation all contribute to the failure of privatization for the states.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: privatization, delegation, nondelegation, administrative, government, contracts, transaction costs

JEL Classification: L33, H57, H41, H51, H53, H72, H70, I38, K23, D73

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 5, 2008 ; Last revised: May 2, 2011

Suggested Citation

Stevenson, Drury D., Privatization of State Administrative Services (August 6, 2008). Louisiana Law Review, Vol. 68, p. 114, 2008 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101746

Contact Information

Drury D. Stevenson (Contact Author)
South Texas College of Law ( email )
1303 San Jacinto Street
Houston, TX 77002
United States
713-646-1897 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.stcl.edu
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,097
Downloads: 185
Download Rank: 93,535
Footnotes:  86

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.250 seconds