Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101924
 
 

References (72)



 
 

Citations (53)



 


 



Electing Directors


Jie Cai


Drexel University

Jacqueline L. Garner


Mississippi State University - Department of Finance and Economics

Ralph A. Walkling


Drexel University - Lebow College of Business

November 6, 2008

Journal of Finance, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are
significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting
mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS
recommendation, have little economic impact on shareholder votes. Even poorly
performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless,
fewer votes lead to lower 'abnormal' CEO compensation and a higher probability of
removing poison pills, classified boards, and CEOs. Meanwhile, director votes have little
impact on election outcomes, firm performance, or director reputation. These results
provide important benchmarks for the current debate about election reforms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 76

Keywords: Board of directors, election of directors

JEL Classification: G34

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Date posted: March 19, 2008 ; Last revised: November 10, 2008

Suggested Citation

Cai, Jie and Garner, Jacqueline L. and Walkling, Ralph A., Electing Directors (November 6, 2008). Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101924

Contact Information

Jie Cai (Contact Author)
Drexel University ( email )
LeBow College of Business
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-895-1755 (Phone)
215-895-2955 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.lebow.drexel.edu/CaiJ/
Jacqueline L. Garner
Mississippi State University - Department of Finance and Economics ( email )
College of Business
McCool Hall, Room 316A PO Box 9580
Mississippi State, MS 39762
United States
662.325.6716 (Phone)
662.325.1977 (Fax)
Ralph August Walkling
Drexel University - Lebow College of Business ( email )
LeBow College of Business
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
(215) 895-4920 (Phone)
(215) 895-6119 (Fax)
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