The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits
David M. Driesen
Syracuse University - College of Law
Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law
April 9, 2008
Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 22, 2009
Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-61
This article evaluates an environmental protection instrument that the literature has hitherto largely overlooked, Dirty Input Limits (DILs), quantitative limits on the inputs that cause pollution. DILs provide an alternative to cumbersome output-based emissions trading and performance standards. DILs have played a role in some of the world's most prominent environmental success stories. They have also begun to influence climate change policy, because of the impossibility of imposing an output-based cap on transport emissions. We evaluate DILs' administrative advantages, efficiency, dynamic properties, and capacity to better integrate environmental protection efforts. DILs, we show, not only have significant advantages that make them a good policy tool, they also have the capacity to help us fruitfully reconceptualize environmental law in more holistic fashion.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52
Keywords: environment, environmental, regulation, climate change, global warming, regulatory instruments, instrument choice, emissions trading, upstream, downstream, inputs, outputs, fossil fuels, cap and trade, pollution prevention, end-of-the-pipe
JEL Classification: K32, L51, O31, O33, O38, Q28, Q38, Q40, Q42, Q48
Date posted: March 6, 2008 ; Last revised: September 24, 2014
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.250 seconds