Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102475
 
 

References (90)



 
 

Citations (25)



 


 



The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: International Evidence


Julian R. Franks


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Colin Mayer


University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Paolo F. Volpin


City University London - Faculty of Finance; London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Hannes F. Wagner


Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research

September 2, 2011

EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper
AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper
Paris December 2011 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI

Abstract:     
We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets and active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets and inactive markets for corporate control, family control is very persistent over time. While family control in high investor protection countries is concentrated in industries with low investment opportunities and low M&A activity, this is not so in countries with low investor protection, where the presence of family control in an industry is unrelated to investment opportunities and M&A activity.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 68

Keywords: ownership, family firms, life cycle, corporate performance

JEL Classification: G32, G34

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 6, 2008 ; Last revised: October 25, 2011

Suggested Citation

Franks, Julian R. and Mayer, Colin and Volpin, Paolo F. and Wagner, Hannes F., The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: International Evidence (September 2, 2011). EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper; AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper; Paris December 2011 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102475 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1102475

Contact Information

Julian R. Franks
London Business School ( email )
Institute of Finance and Accounting
Sussex Place - Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7262 5050 x3449 (Phone)
+44 20 7724 3317 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Colin Mayer
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Paolo F. Volpin
City University London - Faculty of Finance ( email )
London, EC2Y 8HB
Great Britain
London Business School
London
United Kingdom
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org
Hannes F. Wagner (Contact Author)
Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.unibocconi.eu/hanneswagner
Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 5,431
Downloads: 1,288
Download Rank: 7,581
References:  90
Citations:  25
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.375 seconds