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The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: International EvidenceJulian R. FranksLondon Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Colin MayerUniversity of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Paolo F. VolpinLondon Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Hannes F. WagnerBocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research September 2, 2011 EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper Paris December 2011 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI Abstract: We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets and active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets and inactive markets for corporate control, family control is very persistent over time. While family control in high investor protection countries is concentrated in industries with low investment opportunities and low M&A activity, this is not so in countries with low investor protection, where the presence of family control in an industry is unrelated to investment opportunities and M&A activity.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 68 Keywords: ownership, family firms, life cycle, corporate performance JEL Classification: G32, G34 working papers seriesDate posted: March 6, 2008 ; Last revised: October 25, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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