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Do Firms Adjust to a Target Board Structure?

David C. Cicero
University of Delaware - Lerner College of Business and Economics

M. Babajide Wintoki
University of Kansas - School of Business

Tina Yang
Villanova University


July 1, 2009

CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper

Abstract:     
We present evidence that firms pursue target board structures, and that they do so at economically meaningful rates. Using a broad panel of changes to board structure over the period 1991 to 2003, we find that changes are frequent, with approximately two-thirds of firms changing either board size or independence during a two-year period. We predict a target board structure for each firm-year based on existing theory, and find that firms close about 45% of the gap between their actual and predicted target board size, and 63% of the gap between their actual and predicted target board independence over a two-year period. The rate of change is positively associated with the benefits of implementing effective boards and negatively associated with measures of CEO influence. Observed changes in both board independence and size in either direction are consistent with the pursuit of an economically efficient target, suggesting that pressures to adopt boards with prescribed characteristics may reduce efficiency.

Keywords: board independence, board size, board structure, board reform, corporate governance, regulation, endogeneity, dynamic adjustment

JEL Classifications: D23, G34, G38, K22, M14

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 09, 2008 ; Last revised: August 18, 2009

Suggested Citation

Cicero, David C., Wintoki, M. Babajide and Yang, Tina, Do Firms Adjust to a Target Board Structure? (July 1, 2009). CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102498


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Contact Information

David C. Cicero (Contact Author)
University of Delaware - Lerner College of Business and Economics ( email )
Newark, DE 19716
United States
Modupe Babajide Wintoki
University of Kansas - School of Business ( email )
School of Business
Lawrence, KS 66045
United States
Tina Yang
Villanova University ( email )
School of Business
800 Lancaster Avenue
Villanova, PA 19085
United States
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